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03.29: 风华系列讲座2024春季第二场:Rational Trust

——风华系列讲座
2024春第2场

 

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具体信息

 

题目

 

Rational Trust

时间

2024年3月29日(周五)19:00-21:00

 

讲座地点

北京大学燕园22楼212

 

 

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 “北京大学哲学系”微信视频号同步直播直播

 

 

 

 

主讲人简介

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Julius Schönherr

 

Julius Schönherr is an assistant professor on the tenure track at Peking University. He graduated from the University of Maryland in 2019 with a thesis on social coordination and the problem of other minds. His research spans a wide range of topics in social epistemology, the philosophy of mind and moral philosophy. His current work in social epistemology focuses on the rationality of trust, and blame. He is furthermore interested in the various relations between moral responsibility and the emotions. He defends the view that emotions such as anger and disappointment are vital for the attribution of moral responsibility and moral agency.

 

 

 

 

主持人简介

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吴天岳

 

 

吴天岳,贵州安顺人,比利时鲁汶大学哲学博士,北京大学哲学系教授,博士生导师,北京大学外国哲学教研室主任,北京大学西方古典学中心副主任,2019-20年博古睿学者。主要研究西方古代和中世纪哲学,专注于该时期的心灵哲学和伦理学研究,出版有专著《意愿与自由:奥古斯丁意愿概念的道德心理学解读》,在Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales, Augustiniana, Res Philosophica, Review of Metaphysics, Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Thomist等刊物发表过30余篇论文。

 

 

 

 

讲座简介

 
 

According to doxastic accounts of trust, trust requires a belief, for example, the belief that the trustee will do as trusted. This view has been variously criticized on the grounds that trust and belief interact differently with evidence. One oft-mentioned but rarely examined way to explicate this criticism appeals to the tension between trust and evidence gathering: Gathering evidence to support one’s trusting belief erodes one’s trust but not this belief. In this talk, I appeal to recent developments in zetetic epistemology to address this ‘problem of undue inquiry,’ aiming (a) to show why trust erodes when evidence is gathered, and (b) to defend the doxastic account of trust. I shall argue that both belief and trust erode through evidence gathering, if, and only if, it springs from certain interrogative attitudes such as ‘doubting’ or ‘wondering.’ Consequently, in direct opposition to the initial statement of the problem, evidence gathering erodes trust if, and only if, evidence gathering erodes one’s trusting belief.

 

 

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